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The need for direct public job creation efforts is greater today than at any time during the past seven 
decades. With a national unemployment rate that recently exceeded 10 percent and severe economic 
distress in hard-hit communities and population groups, a new federal initiative that puts jobless 
individuals immediately to work must be a central element of any strategy for restoring economic 
growth and responding to pressing human needs in 2010 and beyond. Public service employment 
(PSE) and transitional jobs (TJ) programs that use time-limited, paid work as the centerpiece of 
efforts to assist the unemployed offer tested and urgently needed models for combating the current 
recession and advancing longer-term workforce development goals.  
The absence of recent experience and a corresponding program infrastructure to support the 
large-scale creation of publicly funded jobs presents daunting challenges, particularly in light of the 
rapid implementation necessary to improve employment conditions over the next year. Nonetheless, 
the history of federal job creation programs since the 1930s suggests that these challenges are not 
insurmountable. In many respects, the reluctance of key policymakers to launch a new PSE program 
this past year was rooted in a fundamental misreading of past research. Past experience provides 
ample evidence that public job creation can be undertaken quickly and effectively, with acceptable 
costs, manageable levels of substitution or displacement, and clear benefits to participants and their 
communities (Briggs 1981). 
This paper makes the case for a multiphase approach to public job creation, beginning in 
early 2010 with “fast-track” efforts to support specific PSE projects launched by local governments 
and developing in 2011 and succeeding years into a more sophisticated strategy for combining 
publicly funded jobs with education or training for individuals facing major barriers to labor market 
entry. Innovative TJ programs now operating throughout the nation can provide key building blocks 
for, and guide the development of, a permanent public job creation program, one that can respond 
to changing economic circumstances while addressing the serious employment problems that persist 
throughout the business cycle. 
To quickly ramp up program capacity and develop program infrastructure across the nation, 
a coherent federal strategy and focused investment are needed. In addition, to avoid a repeat of the 
current policy conundrum in future economic downturns (i.e., limited program capacity or 
infrastructure at times of greatest need), the policy goal should be to create a permanent PSE 
program that responds to changing needs across the business cycle. During recessionary periods, the 
program would play a countercyclical role. As labor markets tighten during periods of recovery, the 
program would support transitional jobs with a greater focus on hard-to-employ individuals who 
would otherwise be shut out of the labor market and have a goal of placing participants as soon as 
possible into unsubsidized employment. Appropriations levels for the public job creation initiative 
could be adjusted annually in response to changing levels of need, but it is essential that a program 
authorization and some local capacity remain in place over time. 
The Urgent Need for Publicly Funded Jobs 
The need for direct public job creation efforts is greater today than at any time during the past seven 
decades. Despite the tempering effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA), unemployment remains staggeringly high and is projected to remain above 8 percent over 
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the next two years (Mishel et al. 2009). At the start of the recession in December 2007, the number 
of unemployed persons was 7.5 million, and the unemployment rate was 4.9 percent. As of 
November 2009, 15.4 million people were unemployed, the unemployment rate was 10 percent, and 
9.2 million workers were working part time even though they wanted to work full time.1 As bleak as 
they are, these unemployment rates do not reflect the whole of unemployment experienced by 
discouraged and disadvantaged workers, particularly those with limited work experience who want 
to work but have not succeeded. Many of these potential workers were unemployed even before the 
recession began, facing barriers to employment and having few avenues to address them. Without 
targeted interventions their employment outlook remains particularly dismal. 
During this economic downturn, individuals with little or no work experience and with 
barriers to employment are among the hardest hit. Millions of Americans need assistance to succeed 
in employment. Numerous studies have documented the negative relationship between having 
multiple barriers and access to or success in employment (Danziger et al. 2000; Goldberg 2002; 
Olson and Pavetti 1996; Rangarajan and Johnson 2002; Taylor and Barusch 2004). These challenges 
include having little or no work experience; lack of basic skills, particularly in literacy and numeracy; 
lack of a high school degree; having a criminal record or a disability; and workplace and social skills 
deficits that impede success at work. The number of Americans that face these and other barriers to 
employment is alarming: 
• In the past year, approximately 1.7 millions families a month received Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families, or TANF.2 An extensive body of research suggests that the heads of 
household in these families often have serious barriers to employment that may limit their 
ability to meet program requirements. Nationally, this has resulted in about 20 percent of 
those who leave TANF being disconnected from work or welfare (Blank and Kovak 2008). 
• The majority of the almost 650,000 people that return to American communities each year 
from incarceration3 face barriers to work due to their spotty work histories and criminal 
records. Without viable employment, the likelihood that they will return to prison 
skyrockets. In addition, the effects of reincarceration on the 1.7 million children who have 
an incarcerated parent can be economically and socially devastating for generations 
(Schirmer, Nellis, and Mauer 2009).  
Absent effective interventions, these groups will continue to face high unemployment, 
poverty, and hardship. Prolonged unemployment is associated with rising crime (Winter-Ebmer and 
Raphael 1999), lost productivity in communities, poorer physical and psychological health among 
potential workers (Banks 1995; Frese and Mohn 1987; Warr and Jackson 1985), and families feeling 
the strains of poverty and hardship for generations. As a result, many communities experience high 
corrections costs, health care costs, and need for costly social interventions.  
Public service employment and transitional jobs programs offer tested and urgently needed 
models for combating the current recession and advancing longer-term workforce development 
goals. Both use time-limited, paid work as the centerpiece of efforts to assist the unemployed. PSE 
programs typically seek to provide immediate work opportunities for the unemployed with some 
preference for the long-term jobless and those with low incomes, while TJ programs wrap 
employment and support services around the subsidized job and focus more specifically on people 
with significant barriers to employment.  
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Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the Obama administration 
and Congress have responded to the rapid and extraordinarily severe loss of jobs in creative and 
important ways. In addition to intergovernmental fiscal relief directed primarily to state governments 
and school districts, ARRA uses existing funding authorizations and program structures to boost 
employment levels while also advancing longer-term policy goals in such areas as transportation 
infrastructure and energy efficiency. While some publicly funded jobs are created directly under 
ARRA through the summer youth employment initiative and the TANF Emergency Fund, these 
limited efforts respond to only a fraction of the overall need. As job creation discussions begin anew 
in Congress, an opportunity exists to launch a multiphase public job creation initiative with 
immediate countercyclical and long-term counter-structural impacts.  
Key Elements of Federal Job Creation Initiative 
The case for an ongoing federal commitment to public job creation is analogous in many respects to 
the rationale for a national system of emergency preparedness and disaster relief. While we never 
know when or where a hurricane, tornado, flood, or act of terrorism might occur, a decision to leave 
the nation unprepared to respond to such events would be unthinkable.  Even the egregious 
shortcomings of federal and state responses to Hurricane Katrina, while evoking sharp cries for 
reform, did not cause the federal government to abandon this basic role and responsibility. Similarly, 
although economists remain unable to predict the timing or geography of future recessions, it is 
known with great certainty that periodic economic downturns will cause widespread joblessness and 
human suffering. In the absence of a permanent infrastructure to support the effective use of 
publicly funded jobs, however, America enters each new unemployment crisis unprepared to 
respond quickly and far less able to rely upon PSE programs as arguably the most direct strategy for 
narrowing the jobs deficit. Since the late 1970s, federal policy quite simply has failed to create a 
foundation for prudent state and local planning in anticipation of the next trough in the business 
cycle. 
The key elements of a federal policy to support public job creation are easily identified. One 
strong example of how a large-scale PSE initiative could be structured as an essential complement to 
state and local fiscal relief is provided in a proposal jointly developed by the Center for Community 
Change, Economic Policy Institute, Service Employees International Union, and National League of 
Cities (Savner 2009). Under that proposal, the federal government would distribute funds primarily 
to instrumentalities of local governments based on a formula modeled on that used in the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Key factors in this modified CDBG 
formula would include each jurisdiction’s relative share of substantial unemployment (in excess of 
6.5 percent), poverty, and population. Half of the available funds would be allocated among eligible 
metropolitan cities and counties (referred to as entitlement communities under CDBG) and another 
25 percent would be allocated among the states for grants to non-entitlement communities (e.g., 
cities with populations of less than 50,000 and rural areas). The remaining 25 percent would be 
distributed on a formula basis to states specifically for creating jobs related to the provision of 
human services commonly provided by or financed through state governments. 
Under this joint proposal, individuals eligible to participate in the PSE program would 
include those who either have been unemployed for at least 30 days and reside in a low-income 
household (e.g., eligible for SNAP/food stamps or under the Worker Opportunity Tax Credit) or 
have been unemployed for at least 12 weeks (without regard to household income). Local 
governments would be required to ensure that at least 35–40 percent of those hired under the 
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program are from low-income households. Eligibility provisions along these lines offer a reasonable 
balance in response to competing goals of reaching households with the greatest financial needs and 
extending new employment opportunities to diverse segments of the long-term unemployed. 
“Fast-Track” Implementation during the Program’s First Year 
Recognizing that the effectiveness of a new PSE program as a countercyclical measure depends on 
speedy implementation, local governments receiving federal funds under the program would be 
granted “fast-track” authority to designate a local agency responsible for administering the program 
and hire unemployed residents in positions that are clearly designed to advance national priorities 
and generate important public benefits. Local hiring in this fast-track component of the program 
would begin immediately upon the release of federal funds and continue through the end of the first 
full year of implementation. At the same time, local governments (in consultation with Workforce 
Investment Boards and local TANF agencies) would undertake planning activities for a second and 
more comprehensive phase of the PSE initiative. 
This fast-track authority should be carefully delineated to prevent abuses and limited to a 
modest number of discrete activities with high potential impact in terms of community benefit and 
aggregate job creation. While the possibilities for legislatively sanctioned work activities during the 
first year of implementation are numerous, promising options include these five: 
1. paint and repair schools, community centers, and libraries; 
2. clean up abandoned and vacant properties to alleviate blight in distressed and foreclosure-
affected neighborhoods; 
3. expand emergency food programs through increased outreach and enhanced staffing levels 
to reduce hunger and promote family stability; 
4. augment staffing in Head Start, child care, and other early childhood education programs to 
promote school readiness and early literacy; and 
5. renovate and enhance maintenance of parks, playgrounds, and other public spaces. 
In each instance, the U.S. Department of Labor could provide additional guidance to 
municipal, county, and state governments as necessary regarding permissible PSE placements in 
each of the above categories. However, local officials would be explicitly authorized to proceed 
quickly and could be expected to create between 200,000 and 400,000 temporary, publicly funded 
jobs within the first three to four months of program implementation under these circumstances.  
A More Comprehensive, Longer-Term Second Phase 
While the current levels of joblessness demand urgent federal action, unemployment rates across the 
nation are likely to remain at levels typically associated a deep recession for years to come. For this 
reason, the fast-track component of PSE implementation should be followed by a second phase 
grounded in more extensive local planning and program development. In this second phase, local 
officials would have the opportunity to develop a broader array of work projects or activities (see 
box for a detailed list of possibilities) and build stronger links between PSE placements and 
education, training, or other workforce development services. They would also be required to design 
and implement a more comprehensive set of policies and procedures for recruiting and screening 
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applicants, matching job seekers and PSE positions based upon skills and jobs requirements, 
soliciting community input regarding program elements, and collecting data on program 




Potential Work Activities for Second Phase of PSE Implementation 
Neighborhood/community improvement: Maintenance, repair, and minor renovation of public facilities 
and neighborhood buildings in which public programs operate; improvement and maintenance 
of parks, waterways, and other public spaces; code enforcement, graffiti removal, and property 
maintenance to prevent or alleviate blight, including foreclosed properties. 
Child health and development: Lead paint abatement and prevention programs; staff support for child 
care, preschool, and Head Start centers; outreach for immunizations to protect against 
pneumonia and childhood diseases; access to and coordination of school-based services, 
including as part of efforts to create community schools; staff support for teachers and 
afterschool providers; access to and provision of prenatal care; early intervention services; 
afterschool programming; summer food programs; special education and developmental 
disability programs; and community-based services to runaway and homeless youth. 
Access to public benefits: Outreach and preliminary eligibility screening for EITC, SNAP, 
Medicaid/CHIP, LIHEAP, child care assistance, and other public benefits; maintenance or 
restoration of services provided by public utilities; and restoration or expansion of adult day care 
or home health/homemaker services and of services in public libraries, community-based health 
clinics, and mental health centers. 
Public safety and transportation: Promotion of safe routes to school; mentoring of children or 
adolescents in violence and gang prevention initiatives; street outreach to prevent youth or gang 
violence; provision of transportation services for the disabled; and maintenance or expansion of 
transit services. 
Energy conservation and environmental protection: Home energy audits and low-cost weatherization; trail 
construction and maintenance; flood prevention and stream restoration; outreach and education 
to reduce non-point pollution runoff; and installation of high-efficiency lighting. 
Combinations of paid work, through a PSE position or transitional job, and workforce 
development activities seem particularly promising for individuals facing substantial barriers to 
employment. The range of relevant options include remedial education, basic literacy, or English as a 
second language programs, and specific certification or training that builds occupational skills in 
fields with anticipated job growth or demand. Training efforts could also use existing labor-
management partnerships and on-the-job training models to help workers move into family-
sustaining jobs, thereby creating more entry-level openings for new employees.  
Assuming that the nascent economic recovery is sustained and as jobless rates gradually fall 
to levels traditionally associated with periods of strong economic growth, the focus of federal 
investments in publicly funded jobs should shift from PSE placements to transitional jobs models. 
This adjustment in response to changing economic conditions would include increased targeting to 
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reach individuals with multiple barriers to employment and greater emphasis on successful 
placements in unsubsidized jobs following program participation. Given the many common 
elements of PSE and TJ programs, an ongoing investment in transitional jobs during periods of 
relatively low unemployment would enable states and localities to preserve a public job creation 
infrastructure and provide a foundation for a quick resumption of PSE initiatives if and when the 
need should arise. 
Preventing Substitution or Displacement of Current Employees 
In recent discussions of PSE options among federal policymakers, concerns about potential 
substitution and displacement appear to have received a great deal of attention and emerged as a 
primary reason for not including a PSE program in the latest round of policy recommendations 
advanced by the Obama administration and key congressional leaders. Without question, these 
issues require serious consideration in program design and policy development, but the view that 
they represent an insurmountable obstacle to effective implementation is neither supported by past 
experience nor rooted in a sensible understanding of hiring and employment practices within local 
governments. In the early stages of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act’s (CETA) 
PSE program, shifting staff from regular public payrolls to PSE positions was not clearly prohibited 
and at times not even actively discouraged, serving in essence as a form of local fiscal relief during 
the 1975–76 recession. Such behavior was sharply curtailed as part of the revisions to the PSE 
program in subsequent years, however, and later estimates of substitution and displacement rates 
within CETA indicated that the problem had been successfully addressed. 
In practical terms, the basic eligibility requirement contained in the joint proposal described 
earlier in this section––that eligible individuals be unemployed for at least 30 days––would help 
prevent local governments from removing current employees from public-sector payrolls and 
immediately rehiring them in PSE positions. The joint proposal also calls for: strong prohibitions 
against substitution and displacement; protections for recently laid-off employees, workers on leave, 
and striking workers; and preservation of recall rights under collective bargaining agreements. To 
ensure that these prohibitions and protections can be effectively enforced, the proposal includes 
grievance procedures, arbitration provisions, enforcement authority in the secretary of labor, rights 
to judicial review, and private rights of action.  
Beyond these essential provisions, however, other strategies could be considered to limit or 
discourage substitution and displacement within a PSE program. For example, strong transparency 
provisions of the sort included within ARRA could require local governments to post every PSE 
position created on the Internet, accompanied by specific instructions of how complaints 
concerning displacement or substitution can be filed locally and federally. Under these 
circumstances, attempts to shift workers or jobs from public payrolls to the PSE program would 
become less attractive and easier to detect. 
Local Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) could also protect against displacement or 
substitution. The authorizing statute could specify that local governments can fill PSE slots only 
after the local WIB certifies that such hiring will not result in displacement or substitution. The 
statute could also include enforcement provisions, including potential penalties (e.g., loss of up to 10 
percent of the local Workforce Investment Act (WIA) allocation in the subsequent year) in the event 
that the U.S. Department of Labor determines that PSE hiring violated the prohibition against 
displacement and substitution. In large cities where the WIB is controlled by the city, the threat of 
potential loss of WIA funds would still constitute an effective check against large-scale violations. In 
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medium and smaller communities, the relative independence of the WIB would be akin to an 
independent monitor and thereby create a check against such violations. 
Finally, any PSE program could reduce incentives for substitution and displacement by 
limiting the maximum time that any individual can be employed in a PSE position. Such a provision 
would promote equity (by giving as many people as possible the chance to obtain employment for at 
least a modest period) and facilitate reduction in the size and scope of the program as labor market 
conditions improve (by enabling projects or providers to reduce the number of participants through 
attrition when they hit time limits rather than by firing workers). A maximum employment period of 
six or nine months in the fast-track phase of the program, and of up to 12 months in its subsequent, 
longer-term phase, would make substitution or displacement efforts less attractive and assist local 
officials as they manage and adjust to changes in the size of the PSE program from year to year.  
Every attempt to subsidize employment––whether through tax incentives, wage subsidies, or 
public job creation expenditures––involves some degree of inefficiency, or what economists would 
call “leakage,” when subsidies are provided for jobs that would have been created anyway or 
maintained in the absence of tax benefits or public spending. This unavoidable result is rarely cited 
as a major problem in consideration of tax expenditures to stimulate hiring. It certainly should not 
be viewed as a fatal flaw when direct job creation efforts are carefully designed to prevent 
substitution or displacement on a large scale.  
Additional Opportunities to Build Transitional Jobs Capacity with Federal Support 
While efforts among service providers to implement transitional jobs models continue to grow, 
much remains to be done to build adequate federal, state, and local public infrastructures for 
administering and financing these programs. In the absence of strong federal leadership, a number 
of states, counties, and municipalities have begun to create plans targeted at helping the hardest to 
employ, leveraging funding, and implementing TJ programs to meet growing need. A major 
challenge now is to create a national framework for TJ funding and knowledge development that 
can sustain and strengthen these efforts.  
Historically, the federal government has not provided dedicated funds for TJ programs. 
Certain federal funding sources can be used to support TJ programs in part, such as TANF, WIA, 
and the SNAP Employment and Training program. All these funding sources have rules that create 
barriers for TJ programs in accessing and applying funding (National Transitional Jobs Network 
2009),4 and they have commitments to different kinds of programming that consume most of the 
funding. As a result, federal funding sources taken collectively have not supported or produced 
nearly enough TJ program capacity to meet current needs. However, a number of new TJ funding 
opportunities could improve this outlook and substantially increase the amount of dedicated funding 
available for transitional jobs.  
FY2010 Transitional Jobs Appropriation within the Department of Labor Budget 
The Obama administration has taken a strong step toward ensuring that more Americans will have 
access to transitional jobs opportunities by including funding in its budget to demonstrate and 
evaluate TJ program models. In the fiscal year 2010 Labor, Health, and Education Appropriations 
Consolidated Appropriations Bill, $45 million was included for TJ programming: 
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• In the Department of Labor Pilots, Demonstrations, and Research section, $30 million is 
included for transitional jobs activities, and up to 10 percent of the amount may be used for 
evaluation of such projects or transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services 
and/or the Department of Justice for support of transitional jobs activities; and  
• In section 171 of WIA and section 212 of the Second Chance Act, $15 million is included 
for competitive grants to provide transitional job activities for ex-offenders.  
 
The demonstration will likely serve 3,000 to 5,000 people with barriers to employment with 
an anticipated focus on noncustodial parents and people exiting prison. This estimate assumes the 
transitional jobs wages range from $7.25 to $8.50 an hour (depending on the local minimum wage) 
and the length of time in the transitional job ranges from three to six months.5 
The demonstration provides a key opportunity to both build additional capacity across the 
country and to test enhancements to the model based on what has been learned from previous and 
ongoing studies of TJ programs. Capacity could be built within the federal government to administer 
and oversee transitional jobs funds. Enhancements to the model could include rigorous targeting of 
the program to the hardest to employ, integrating literacy programming with transitional jobs to 
increase preparedness to enter training, phasing the transitional job into an on-the-job training 
opportunity in industries where high math and reading levels are not prerequisites, lengthening the 
transitional job portion for those whose chances of success in the private labor market are limited, 
and adding intensive transition supports from the transitional job into the unsubsidized job. 
Inclusion of TJ Provisions in TANF Reauthorization 
In several parts of the country in the late 1990s, subsidized employment programs grew in the form 
of transitional jobs strategies6 focused on supporting the transition to work for TANF recipients. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 authorized the 
TANF block grant to states, which allowed funds for states to develop subsidized employment 
programs targeted at people eligible for TANF and noncustodial parents of eligible children.  
In addition to the block grant, funds available through the Welfare to Work (WtW) grant 
program, administered by the Department of Labor and evaluated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services, spurred much of the early growth in the transitional jobs strategy targeted at 
welfare recipients. Evaluations of the WtW demonstrations highlighted TJ programs as a promising 
practice in serving hard-to-employ populations and noted the value of wage-paid work as a vehicle 
to help with the transition to work. As the WtW funding phased out, transitional jobs activity for 
TANF recipients slowed owing to challenges in using the TANF block grant for support. Under the 
block grant, states have the flexibility to design and implement transitional jobs and other subsidized 
employment programs, but there are barriers to doing so effectively.  
The passage of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) in 2005, with its significantly more 
stringent work requirements and reduced flexibility in what activities counted as allowable work 
activities, put new pressure on states to quickly enroll TANF participants in limited, federally 
defined countable “core” and “non-core” activities and to reduce caseloads or face significant 
penalties (Frank 2007). While subsidized employment and other activities in which the TANF 
participants are paid are defined as core countable activities toward TANF work participation rates, 
other barrier removal activities and education or training are not. Since TJ programs combine a 
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package of services and supports considered core and non-core activities, states have been reluctant 
to develop these programs because of complicated reporting and verification requirements. In a 
context that places greater emphasis on verifying participation in countable activities rather than 
demonstrating the effectiveness of program interventions, many states have had difficulty 
implementing program services such as transitional jobs programs, which combine core and non-
core activities to support participant success.  
TANF reauthorization offers an opportunity to ensure that states have the flexibility to 
develop employment service packages, like TJ programs, that effectively meet the needs of TANF 
recipients with barriers to employment. Through reauthorization, administrative barriers to 
implementation can be reduced, the definition of the subsidized employment activity can be 
broadened to include TJ programs, and a comprehensive definition of transitional jobs that reflects 
the package of services and supports that TJ programs deliver can be included.  
In addition to the states already doing so, many states have interest in operating statewide 
transitional jobs programs for TANF recipients. This became widely apparent when the TANF 
Emergency Funds were made available through ARRA. If the disincentives in current funding can 
be addressed through TANF reauthorization, rapid expansion of transitional jobs for the hardest to 
employ welfare recipients is likely to occur. 
Inclusion of TJ Provisions in WIA Reauthorization 
The transitional jobs model seeks to create a pathway out of poverty via work by drawing upon 
lessons from both the human services and workforce development fields. In practice, the 
populations targeted by TJ programs––those with severe learning and skills deficits, often combined 
with other employment barriers––are much more likely to be served by human services agencies 
than the workforce development system. However, individuals facing these challenges by and large 
want to work and succeed in work. Prioritizing funding for transitional jobs within the nation’s 
workforce development system is one key way to align and assemble the nation’s workforce services 
along a continuum of opportunities for all as stepping stones along a pathway out of poverty.  
The Workforce Investment Act is the main federal funding stream for employment and 
training services. Although low-income individuals and public assistance recipients have priority of 
service under the WIA adult funds, since the enactment of WIA, the share of low-income 
individuals receiving intensive or training services through the WIA adult program has dropped to 
just under half (CLASP 2008). Several factors may be contributing to the declining share of low-
income individuals who exit the WIA adult program, including declining funding, types of 
performance measures, sequential service requirements, and the lack of any strong, explicitly defined 
targeting requirement in current law. 
While current WIA law and regulations support several elements of TJ programs (including 
employer engagement, case management, job placement, follow-up services, and education and 
training components of the program), and WIA funds can be used to fund wages for participants in 
certain instances through on-the-job training or paid work experience, unfortunately they have 
proven difficult to use for TJ programming. WIA funding is challenging for TJ programs to access 
and manage given that only parts of the program are consistently supported, WIA does not 
prioritize or emphasize transitional jobs, and WIA typically does not provide resources for the core 
component of the strategy: the paid transitional job.  
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WIA reauthorization presents an opportunity to remove disincentives to serving those with 
barriers to employment, require stronger targeting of services, and provide support for program 
models geared toward helping individuals who face difficulties in the labor market, such as 
transitional jobs. To ensure that the WIA adult program explicitly supports TJ programs for 
individuals with severe and multiple barriers to employment, it must be changed to include a 
definition of transitional jobs and to specify that transitional jobs are an allowable activity and 
allowable use of funds. For these changes to be effective, WIA reauthorization also should include 
increased funding, have a heightened emphasis on training and services that enable people to 
succeed in training, and remove disincentives in performance measures to encourage provision of 
services to individuals with disabilities and other barriers to employment (Baider 2008). If these 
changes are made to WIA, it could result in a workforce development system that is much more 
effective at serving people with barriers to employment.  
Expanded TJ Use for Ex-offenders in Reentry Initiatives 
Nearly 650,000 people are released from incarceration every year in the United States, and most 
return to incarceration within three years. This reality has left many states and localities seeking 
effective solutions to curb recidivism and stem the rising costs borne by corrections systems, 
families, communities, and social service systems. Employment is one stabilizing force for people as 
they reenter communities from incarceration, and rigorous, random assignment evaluations of TJ 
programs have found statistically significant decreases on recidivism by those that participate in TJ 
programs compared with those in job search activities (Redcross et al. 2009).  
Because of these realities, TJ programs are expanding across the country to meet the 
employment needs of people reentering communities from incarceration. TJ programs help stabilize 
individuals returning from incarceration, provide much-needed income, focus on addressing 
personal and work-related barriers, provide a current reference for employers, and can help meet the 
responsibilities of probation and parole as well as link participants with housing, treatment, 
education or training, family reunification, and other support services.  
The Second Chance Act included the most robust set of resources to date to help states and 
localities plan and implement effective reentry solutions. TJ programs were included within the 
legislation as an allowable use of grant funds for government entity planning efforts and nonprofit 
mentoring and juvenile justice program development. As a result of the availability of these 
resources, several government planning efforts and individual program development efforts 
included TJ programs in grant applications. While initial funding under the Second Chance Act fell 
far short of both interest and need, a greater number of TJ programs for people returning from 
incarceration may emerge if additional grant funds become available. 
The newly introduced Criminal Justice Reinvestment Act of 2009 would establish a federal 
grant program to help states and local jurisdictions implement data-driven, evidence-based policies 
to increase public safety, control growth in prison and jail populations, and slow spending on 
corrections. After identifying the best strategies, communities could apply for funds to implement an 
array of risk-reduction programs including education or job training. This opportunity provides a 
potential new source of support for TJ programs, and work could be done to ensure that transitional 
jobs constitute an allowable use of these funds.  
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Research Evidence to Support PSE and TJ Investments 
While a thorough review of the research literature on public job creation efforts is well beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is important to note that the portrayal of PSE programs as inherently wasteful 
or ineffective is at odds with much of the research evidence.7 The nation’s oldest and largest federal 
job creation programs—such as the PSE programs created as part of the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973 and the Depression-era Works Progress 
Administration (WPA)—certainly had their shortcomings. However, the full body of research on 
these programs also documents their impressive accomplishments and provides ample basis for 
concluding that modern PSE adaptations could successfully advance key public policy goals during 
periods of high unemployment. In addition, the focus on these very large scale federal initiatives 
often obscures the promising results generated by several smaller, more recent innovations that 
suggest that publicly funded jobs should be viewed as more flexible policy tools that can help hard-
to-employ individuals overcome employment barriers even in times of relative prosperity.8  
Looking back, the WPA achieved remarkable scale by putting more than 3 million 
unemployed Americans back to work at its peak in 1938. Its most enduring legacy is found in its 
contributions to the nation's infrastructure. Under the program, the nation built or reconstructed 
617,000 miles of new roads, 124,000 bridges and viaducts, and 35,000 buildings. It also financed a 
wide array of other labor-intensive work projects, including the construction of sidewalks, street 
curbs, school athletic fields, parks, playgrounds, and landing fields as well as national landmarks such 
as the Philadelphia Art Museum and New York City's Central Park Zoo and LaGuardia Airport. 
Implemented in an era before the advent of in-depth program evaluations, little is known about the 
impact of the WPA on participants beyond its obvious role in helping meet their basic subsistence 
needs.  
The success of CETA’s PSE program was defined initially by how quickly new PSE slots 
were created to combat widespread joblessness. The scale at which the program operated was 
impressive. In 1978, the PSE program provided jobs for more than 700,000 disadvantaged adults 
throughout the nation. Overall, the program also served a very disadvantaged population. More than 
three-quarters of all PSE enrollees in fiscal year 1980 earned less than $4,000 during the previous 
year. Half these enrollees had been unemployed for more than 13 weeks, and two-fifths were 
receiving some form of public assistance. One in every two enrollees was a minority, and one in 
three lacked a high school diploma. While some of the work performed by participants no doubt 
would have been undertaken in the absence of the program, field studies conducted between 1977 
and 1980 suggest that between 80 and 90 percent of CETA’s PSE expenditures contributed directly 
to net job creation. 
At the same time, local governments were faced with many challenges as they sought to 
implement the CETA PSE program under far-from-ideal conditions. Pressures for rapid expansion 
in 1977 and 1978 seriously compromised attempts to maintain program quality. Shifting goals and 
eligibility criteria gave local administrators little chance to set clear objectives and be held 
accountable for results, particularly as the primary measure of the program's effectiveness shifted 
within the span of a few short years from aggregate job creation to success in moving participants 
into unsubsidized jobs. Perhaps surprisingly under these circumstances, more rigorous evaluations 
of the PSE program still found lasting impacts on participants' earnings, particularly for women. For 
example, the annual earnings in 1978 of female PSE participants who had enrolled in fiscal year 
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1976 were $1,100 higher than those of matched control groups. Earnings gains among white men 
enrolled that year were more modest, and no gains were found for minority men. 
Public job creation strategies received much less attention in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
following the elimination of the CETA PSE program during the first year of the Reagan 
administration. Nonetheless, evaluations of a number of smaller-scale programs during this period 
add to the accumulated evidence that public job creation can be an important tool for aiding 
disadvantaged workers and depressed communities. Some of these models focused explicitly on 
transitions into unsubsidized employment, relying on close supervision, time-limited work 
assignments, intensive job search or placement activities, and support services to help participants 
move into the regular job market. These programs heavily emphasized skills development, 
frequently combining paid work with education or training to boost participants' employability. 
Other initiatives were designed primarily to put people back to work quickly in times of high 
unemployment and to increase the overall supply of jobs available to low-skilled workers. While 
virtually all these efforts have sought to assist relatively disadvantaged individuals, some have been 
targeted exclusively on longer-term welfare recipients or unemployed youth.  
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a resurgence of interest in developing publicly funded 
employment opportunities for people who are chronically unemployed, with an increasing emphasis 
on transitional jobs focused on the hardest to employ. This emphasis on the hardest to employ 
resulted from three trends:  
• through the creation and reauthorization of the TANF program, new attention was focused 
on long-term welfare recipients who had limited work experience;  
• as a result of record high prison populations, the needs of newly released people with 
criminal records back into communities became more prominent; and  
• with the large-scale creation of plans to end homelessness nationwide, the employment 
challenges faced by people who are homeless became more apparent.  
 
As these hard-to-employ populations grew, so did the acknowledgement that traditional 
workforce development systems were not designed to serve them well. 
During this time, both program expansion and research were spurred, the most 
comprehensive of which is the Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration and 
Evaluation Project, which is testing innovative employment strategies for groups facing serious 
obstacles to finding and keeping a steady job. While final reports from the study are forthcoming, a 
number of important findings relating to transitional jobs have been documented: 
• The evaluation of Philadelphia’s Transitional Work Corporation (TWC) uses a rigorous 
design in which nearly 2,000 long-term and potential long-term welfare/TANF recipients 
were assigned at random to TWC’s transitional jobs program, or STEP (barrier removal 
activities), or to a control group that did not participate in either program. After 18 months, 
the TJ participants experienced statistically significant increases in earnings as well as 
significant deceases in both receipt of TANF and TANF payment amounts. These results 
show the TJ model providing significantly better outcomes than both the control group and 
the group receiving pre-employment services, but the fact that only about half of the 
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program group ever worked in a transitional job may have diluted the program’s impact. 
TWC’s program had the greatest effect on unsubsidized employment among the most 
disadvantaged participants, defined as those with little or no recent employment and long 
histories of TANF receipt (Bloom 2008; Bloom et al. 2009; Jacobs 2009). 
• The impacts of Center for Employment Opportunities’ (CEO) transitional jobs program in 
New York City are also being assessed using a rigorous research design. A total of 977 ex-
prisoners who reported to CEO were assigned, at random, to either a program group that 
was eligible for all of CEO’s services or a control group that received basic job search 
assistance. In the first two years of follow-up, CEO generated a large but short-lived increase 
in employment; the increase was driven by CEO’s transitional jobs. By the end of the first 
year of the study period, the program and control groups were equally likely to be employed, 
and their earnings were similar. Yet strikingly, CEO reduced recidivism during both the first 
and the second year of the study period: the program group was significantly less likely than 
the control group to be convicted of a crime, to be admitted to prison for a new conviction, 
or to be incarcerated for any reason in prison or jail during the first two years of the study 
period (Redcross 2009; Redcross et al. 2009). New research on TJ and recidivism is ongoing 
(Joyce Foundation 2009). 
 
While the findings from this latest round of research appear mixed, a number of 
improvements to the program model have occurred since the studies began to enhance longer-term 
outcomes. For example, the research shows that transitional jobs programs substantially increased 
employment in the short term but the effects fade. Transitional jobs programs have since altered the 
model to include more robust employment transition and retention services, and program data are 
showing more lasting employment effects. Research findings on employment rates for the control 
groups in these studies are low, indicating that programs are successfully targeting groups that had 
great difficulty finding employment and who otherwise may not be employed. The research evidence 
also shows that TJ programs meet important objectives beyond employment—most notably 
reductions in recidivism—highlighting the importance of thinking more broadly about the value of 
these programs. Finally, the studies have documented the feasibility of operating large-scale 
transitional jobs programs that offer real work. With sustained federal investments in TJ expansion 
and knowledge development, future refinements and adjustments to current TJ models hold the 
promise for even stronger outcomes for the most disadvantaged jobseekers. 
ARRA: Early Lessons Learned about Job Creation 
No dedicated funds for public service employment or transitional jobs programs were authorized 
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, although subsidized employment was an 
allowable activity for some of the funds (most notably the TANF Emergency Funds and the youth 
summer jobs program).  
With the opportunity to develop or expand subsidized employment programs provided 
through ARRA’s TANF Emergency Fund and guidance by the Department of Health and Human 
Services articulating that expenditures for subsidized employment should include “all expenditures 
related to operating a subsidized employment program, including the cost of overseeing the 
program, developing work sites, and providing training to participants,” several counties and states 
began  developing subsidized employment and transitional jobs programs focused on providing 
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immediate subsidized income, supportive services, work experience, and skill building leading to 
unsubsidized employment.  
While HHS’s flexibility and guidance on the use of third-party expenditures toward a state’s 
20 percent allocation for expanded TANF services9 has allowed for a greater number of states to 
draw down ARRA TANF emergency funds and to build and expand subsidized employment and 
transitional jobs programs, many cash-strapped states have cited the match requirement as the most 
significant barrier to implementing or expanding TANF services despite significant interest in doing 
so. For some states and counties, however, collaborations with employers, private foundations, 
human services and workforce development agencies, and service providers expanded significantly 
during this period, signaling the desire for program development and a deepening of capacity and 
infrastructure to do so.  
The interest and take-up of subsidized employment and transitional jobs programs given the 
resources and flexibility to do so indicate that states recognize immediate wage-paid employment as 
vital to getting earned income into the pockets of individuals and supporting community economic 
stability.  
Increases in Workforce Investment Act allocations for youth services through ARRA and 
the Department of  Labor’s guidance encouraging the development of  transitional jobs programs for 
older, out-of-school youth resulted in a handful of  states and entities developing Transitional Jobs 
programs for these youth in 2009. For example, building on their youth summer jobs efforts, the 
Georgia Department of  Labor rolled out a transitional jobs program for at-risk and older out-of-
school youth (age 14–24) with one or more barriers to employment. Internships were provided by 
private and public employers for six to eight weeks. Wages started at minimum wage and averaged 
$9 to $10 an hour.  
 
Examples of ARRA TANF Emergency Funds Used for Transitional Jobs  
 
• Los Angeles County is using its share of TANF Emergency Funds to expand TJ 
opportunities with a goal of placing 10,000 participants in subsidized employment by March 
2010. Partners include the South Bay Workforce Investment Board, United Way, and the L.A 
Economic Development Corporation. San Francisco County is also using TANF 
Emergency Funds to expand its JOBS NOW! program to provide TJ slots to an additional 
1,000 unemployed and underemployed parents by September 2010.  
• Additionally, at least 10 other counties in California are developing or expanding TJ 
program models as a result of ARRA TANF Emergency Funds. In total, California estimates 
it will use more than $300 million in TANF Emergency Funds for TJ programs.  
• New York State is planning a $39 million effort to provide transitional jobs program 
opportunities to unemployed individuals. The state will spend $25 million to create a new 
Transitional Jobs Initiative to provide paid, subsidized work experience—combined with 
educational opportunities related to work—to TANF-eligible individuals including 
disconnected youth and formerly incarcerated. Remaining funds will be used to create TJ 
programs leading to the green jobs and health care sectors. 
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While American Recovery and Reinvestment Act investments are still under way, some early 
lessons are already apparent. Despite intense efforts to allocate, disburse, and spend new federal 
funds quickly, the focus on infrastructure improvements and other capital-intensive projects has 
resulted in longer lead times for implementation and completion than would be expected in a PSE 
program. In addition, while information regarding the job creation impact of many of these projects 
remains incomplete, it seems likely that their capital and skill requirements will result in relatively 
high costs per job created and fewer employment opportunities for less-skilled individuals among 
the unemployed. The evidence and experience of state subsidized jobs activity related to ARRA 
indicates that the interest in a national PSE and transitional jobs program exists, and could be 
further expanded and strengthened with dedicated funding and investments in infrastructure 
development.  
Conclusion  
A new federal initiative that puts jobless individuals immediately to work must be a central element 
of any strategy for restoring economic growth and responding to pressing human needs in 2010 and 
beyond. To quickly ramp up program capacity and ensure effective implementation across the 
nation, a coherent federal strategy and focused investment are needed. In addition, for future 
economic downturns, the policy goal should be to create a permanent public job creation 
infrastructure that responds to changing needs across the business cycle. During recessionary 
periods, federal funding for publicly funded jobs would be focused on public service employment 
programs that primarily play a countercyclical role. As labor markets tighten during periods of 
recovery, federal investments would shift to emphasize transitional jobs models, with a greater focus 
on hard-to-employ individuals who would otherwise be shut out of the labor market and a goal of 
placing participants as soon as possible into unsubsidized employment.  
Past experience and research findings offer frequent reminders that both PSE and TJ 
programs are complex policy interventions and therefore challenging to design and implement 
effectively. For this reason, federal investments in public job creation must include a sustained 
commitment to state and local knowledge development and capacity-building efforts. The potential 
benefits of PSE and TJ programs as national policy tools are far reaching: they provide much-
needed work and earned income that stimulates communities by quickly employing people and 
providing beneficial work in neighborhoods. In addition, the need for publicly funded jobs is—and 
will continue to be—great, and interest among key policymakers at all levels is high. With strong 
federal action now, the Obama administration and Congress can continue to combat the current 
economic crisis and also lay the groundwork for measures that can greatly enhance America's 
readiness to respond to any future economic downturn. 
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